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Abstract—Although the frequent monitoring of smart meters
enables granular control over energy resources, it also increases
the risk of leakage of private information such as income, home
occupancy, and power consumption behavior that can be inferred
from the data by an adversary. We propose a method of releasing
modified smart meter data so specific private attributes are
obscured while the utility of the data for use in an energy resource
controller is preserved. The method achieves privatization by
injecting noise conditional on the private attribute through a
linear filter learned via a minimax optimization. The optimization
contains the loss function of a classifier for the private at-
tribute, which we maximize, and the energy resource controller’s
objective formulated as a canonical form optimization, which
we minimize. We perform our experiment on a dataset of
household consumption with solar generation and another from
the Commission for Energy Regulation that contains household
smart meter data with sensitive attributes such as income and
home occupancy. We demonstrate that our method is able to
significantly reduce the ability of an adversary to classify the
private attribute while maintaining a similar objective value for
an energy storage controller.
Index Terms—Smart Meter, Privacy, Optimization, Battery
Storage
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the power grid has been managed by the
producers and grid operators with information primarily ex-
changed among the large asset owners with little feedback
from its end users. However, the push for renewable energy
sources has brought about the rise of distributed energy
resources (DERs) that lie under the control of many smaller
and disparate users causing a paradigm shift in the flow of
information in the grid. The successful operation of DERs
and other smart grid technologies depends on the exchange
of large amounts of data from many different end users [1]–
[3]. Unfortunately, it may be unrealistic to assume the data
will be available without consideration of the privacy concerns
the data owners may face. It has been demonstrated that
the increased granularity of data required for smart grid
operation enables the inference of personal information [4],
which suggests data owners may be reluctant to exchange their
data without some effort towards privacy preservation.
Studies have investigated various approaches to protect
smart meter data privacy using a number of different met-
rics. While detailed surveys are given in [5], [6], we briefly
cover a few popular solutions here. Aggregating data or its
statistics has been considered [7], [8] to provide user privacy
since the aggregated data does not reflect any specific meter
data above a certain aggregation size. Another approach at
privatization comes from differential privacy [9], which is
widely adopted in privacy mechanism design and analysis
in the context of energy data [10]–[14]. Specifically, studies
[10], [11] and [12] proposed several frameworks for reducing
the mutual information between raw data and privatized data
(e.g. power profiles). Approaches proposed in [13] investigated
the differential privacy effect with some noise injection (e.g.
Laplace noise). It showed the aggregation group size must
be of the order of thousands of smart meters in order to
have reasonable utility. And [14] explored how much noise is
required to be added to the data in order to achieve a certain
level of differential privacy for existing Laplace mechanism in
the context of solving optimal power flow.
We distinguish our studies by focusing on developing a
methodology that learns an optimal noise injection for bal-
ancing the trade off between privacy and data utility, thus,
preserving as much utility in the data as possible. It differs
from strict differential privacy because we use a general notion
of privacy that is the reduced correlation between private
attributes and the data. This general notion of privacy gives
us the flexibility to maintain the utility of the data while still
eliminating an adversary’s ability to recognize certain private
attributes. Since many applications of smart meter data involve
their use in optimization procedures, we define the utility as
the performance achieved when such data is used for optimal
control. We consider a scenario where individual owners of
DERs, such as battery storage systems, wish to privatize their
data before releasing it to a DER aggregator to make optimal
control decisions on their behalf, which can have applications
in the context of [1], [2].
Our primary contributions are a minimax approach to gen-
erate realistic meter data that is decorrelated from sensitive
attributes while maintaining limited performance loss of a cost
minimization optimal control algorithm using battery storage.
Additionally, we developed a parallelized method that can be
easily incorporated in modern deep learning architectures. The
correlation of data privatized by our method with sensitive
attributes and the performance of a control algorithm is
evaluated on two real datasets of residential power demand:
one with synthetic sensitive labels and one with real labels.
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We demonstrate that our method is able to decrease the
classification accuracy of an adversary by over 20% while
maintaining the performance of the optimization to within 10%
over both datasets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we describe
the energy resource control in section II, control with pri-
vatized data generated from the minimax learning algorithm
in section III, experiments and results on the two datasets in
section IV, and the Conclusion in Section section V.
II. ENERGY RESOURCE CONTROL
A. Notation
We use bold letters for vectors and matrices and regular
letters for scalars. Given two vectors x and y ∈ Rn, x ≥ y
represents the element-wise order x(i) ≥ y(i) for i ∈ [n]
where [n] denotes the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}. And x ≥ 0
means all elements in the vector are not less than the scalar
zero. We make the dependence on the underlying probability
distribution P when we write expectations (e.g. EP [X] where
X denotes a random variable). The Frobenius norm of a matrix
A is ||A||F . We write ∇θL(θ;X) or dL(θ;X), where we
typically mean differentiation of the loss function L with
respect to the parameter θ ∈ Rn. N stands for Normal (or
Gaussian) distribution and R+ denotes the non-negative real
numbers. We use := to represent ”define as.” All the vectors
are column vectors by default unless we explicitly address
otherwise in a specific context.
B. Battery storage control
Control with deterministic demand: Consider a basic bat-
tery control problem with the goal of minimizing the energy
cost given a prescribed price p ∈ RH where H is the
time horizon that is typically 24 if it is an hourly price. An
uncontrollable electricity demand is specified as d ∈ RH+ .
We denote the decision variables for battery control to be x
and expand it into xin,xout,xs ∈ RH+ that represents the
charging, discharging, and the amount of charge in storage,
i.e. xᵀ = [xᵀin,x
ᵀ
out,x
ᵀ
s ]. The battery optimal control is
formulated as follows (Problem1):
min
x
pᵀ(xin − xout + d)+ + β1||xin||22 + β2||xout||22
+ β3||xs − αB||22
(1a)
s.t. xs(j + 1) = xs(j)− 1
ηout
xout(j) + ηinxin(j) ∀j ∈ [H]
(1b)
xs(1) = Binit (1c)
0 ≤ xin ≤ cin (1d)
0 ≤ xout ≤ cout (1e)
0 ≤ xs ≤ B. (1f)
The linear term (with respect to x) in the objective is the cost
of electricity when there is no value for selling the energy back
to the grid. This represents a situation where there are no net-
metering incentives. The quadratic penalty terms β1||xin||22
and β2||xout||22 are added to protect the battery state of health
in the horizon [15]. The term β3||xs − αB||22 is added to set
the battery state to be close to the target value αB with B as
the battery size and α ∈ (0, 1). β1, β2, β3 are hyper-parameters
to control these penalties. cin and cout are the charging-in and
discharging-out power capacities. And the parameter ηin and
ηout denote the charging and discharging efficiency (between
0 and 1). The constraint (1b) indicates that the battery state in
the next timestep equals the current battery state adding up the
net charging amount (summing up charging and discharging
together). Constraint (1c) sets the initial state of the battery
to have Binit. To simplify the notation, we define a set
X := {x|(1b) - (1f) are feasible for some x ∈ R3H}. Hence,
we use x ∈ X to succinctly express that x satisfies the battery
constraints. We convert the problem (1) into canonical convex
form in Appendix VI-B and develop a paralleled algorithm
making use of automatic differentiation, open-source convex
solvers, and pytorch [16]–a popular deep learning framework.
Control with stochastic demand: When determining the
control with an uncertain demand, we minimize the expected
cost under some demand distribution P . The objective is
slightly changed as follows (Problem2):
minLu(x,d) := min
x
Ed∼P
[
pᵀ(xin − xout + d)+
]
+ β1||xin||22 + β2||xout||22 + β3||xs − αB||22
(2a)
s.t. x ∈ X . (2b)
III. CONTROL WITH PRIVATIZED DEMAND
Protecting privacy in our context means reducing the corre-
lation between the smart meter data and the sensitive attribute
of the data owner, e.g. income or square-footage of the house.
We justify why such a consideration of privacy protection is
useful in practice in section III-A
A. Revealing privacy from data
In this section, we consider a simple scenario that the
sensitive information is a binary label, such as a small or
large home, which can be inferred from smart meter data.
Given the raw demand d ∈ RH+ and sensitive label y ∈ {0, 1},
the adversary builds a classifier fψ that takes in demand d to
estimate y with a prescribed loss function La. Specifically, we
assume the adversary minimizes the classification loss
min
ψ
La
(
fψ(d), y
)
to infer the private information y. A popular choice of classi-
fication loss is cross-entropy loss (or log-loss) [17]
min
ψ
{
− y log(fψ(d))− (1− y) log
(
1− fψ(d)
)}
when y is a binary variable. The classifier fψ is parameterized
by ψ and can be a neural network that outputs an estimate
of the probability of the positive label. Previous studies
[18], [19] showed that estimating a sensitive label such as
income or square-footage of the house reaches 69% accuracy
using features of smart meter data and models like support
vector machine or random forest. We use an alternative neural
network model that leverages the daily power consumption
(demand) and achieve state of the art accuracy of the private
label. More details can be found in section IV.
B. Control with private demand
Our goal is to minimize energy cost incorporating of
privacy protection. Specifically, we design a data generator
that creates a perturbed version of the raw demand data in
a way that increases the adversarial classification loss, while
enabling an optimal controller to minimize the energy cost.
From a modeling perspective, we have a minimax problem
(Problem3):
min
G
Lu
(
x˜∗(d˜),d
)− λaLa(f(d˜),y) (3a)
s.t. d˜ = d+G
[
ε
y
]
, ε ∼ N (0, I) (3b)
x˜∗(d˜) = arg min
x∈X
Lu(x, d˜), (3c)
where the parameter G is a matrix that affects the distribution
of d˜. In this case, we consider a linear transformation of
Gaussian noise ε. Variable y is the one-hot encoding of the
sensitive binary label, and fψ is a classifier that takes in the
perturbed demand data and predicts the corresponding label
private label. The Lu stands for utility loss. It is important
to note that Lu in the objective uses the raw demand to
evaluate the cost of the control decisions determined using the
perturbed demand. This represents the case where the storage
unit acts on the perturbed information, but the real world value
is based on the original raw data.
In order to solve the non-trivial optimization (3), we sim-
plify the constraints and make use of adversarial training that
is further explained in section III-C, which is a common
technique in studies of generative adversarial networks (GAN)
and their applications [20], [21].
We add a regularization term E||d˜ − d||22 in the objective
with an additional hyper-parameter κ,
min
G
Lu
(
x˜∗(d˜),d
)− λaLa(f(d˜),y) + κE||d˜− d||22, (4)
which helps convergence of the training and preserves parts
of the demand that are not related to the privacy or utility loss
instead of allowing them to be perturbed arbitrarily.
We can denote matrix G = [Γ,V ] with Γ ∈ RH×H and
V ∈ RH×2. The altered demand then becomes d˜ = d+ Γε+
V y. By denoting pi to be the prior distribution of one-hot
labels, e.g. pi = [p, 1− p]ᵀ where p is the prior probability of
a positive label, we can rewrite the distortion regularization
as
E(||d˜− d||22) = E
[||d+ Γε+ V y − d||22]
= E
[
(Γε+ V y)ᵀ(Γε+ V y)
]
= E(εᵀΓᵀΓε+ yᵀV ᵀV y + yᵀV ᵀΓε+ εᵀΓᵀV y)
(i)
= E
[
Tr(ΓεεᵀΓᵀ) + Tr(V yyᵀV ᵀ)
]
(ii)
= Tr(ΓE[εεᵀ︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
]ΓT )
+ Tr
( | |v1 v2
| |
[ p2 p(1− p)
p(1− p) (1− p)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[yyᵀ]
[− vᵀ1 −− vᵀ2 −
])
(iii)
= Tr(ΓΓᵀ) + ||pv1 + (1− p)v2||22
= ||Γ||2F + ||V pi||22
(5)
Equality (i) uses the fact that ε has zero mean. Equality
(ii) expands out V as column vectors [v1,v2] and expresses
E[yyᵀ] = pipiᵀ =
[
p
1− p
]
[p 1− p]. Rearranging the expres-
sions yields equality (iii).
Therefore, we can equivalently penalize the Frobenius norm
of Γ and l2 norm of the vector V pi, i.e. ||Γ||2F + ||V pi||22,
instead of taking the empirical mean of the demand difference
when performing the regularization. To summarize, the data
generator determines the filter weight G and outputs the
perturbed demand d˜, while the adversary takes in the altered
demand d˜ and private labels y to try to learn a classifier.
C. Minimax learning
We construct two neural networks to perform the roles of
the two players, one is for the data generator and the other one
is for the adversary. To train the adversary, we minimize the
cross-entropy loss La, i.e. minψ La
(
fψ(d˜), y
)
, which follows
the loss function mentioned in section III-A. For the generator,
we decouple the training into two steps. First, we leverage the
loss that is passed from the adversary to update the matrix
weight G = [Γ,V ], i.e.
(step1) min
G
−λaLa
(
fψ
(
d+ Γε+ V y
)
,y
)
+ κ
(||Γ||2F + ||V pi||22)
(i)
= min
G=[Γ,V ]
−λa log
(
1− fψ
(
d+ Γε+ V y
))
+ κ
(||Γ||2F + ||V pi||22),
(6)
where κ is the hyper-parameter that penalizes the distance
between d˜ and d implicitly. Equality (i) uses the log-loss as
the classification loss for the binary label. The next step is to
use the privatized demand d˜ = d + Ĝ
[
ε
y
]
to determine the
control by running the following optimization:
(step2) arg min
x
Eε∼N (0,I)
{
pᵀ
(
xin − xout + d˜
)
+
+ β1||xin||22 + β2||xout||22 + β3||xs − αB||22
} (7a)
s.t. x ∈ X . (7b)
The optimal solution of the above convex problem (7) is x˜∗,
or more specifically x˜∗(d˜), because it is a function of the
privatized demand, which is aligned with equation (3c). The
third step calculates the loss, Lu(x˜∗,d), using x˜∗(d˜) and the
original raw demand expressed as:
(step3)Lu(x˜∗(d˜),d) = pᵀ
(
x˜∗in(d˜)− x˜∗out(d˜) + d
)
+
+ β1||x˜∗in||22 + β2||x˜∗out||22 + β3||x˜∗s − αB||22.
(8a)
We update G using gradient descent with the gradient
determined by the chain rule. Recall that the generator outputs
a privatized demand with reduced correlation to the sensitive
label that is also used to yield the storage control decisions.
Those decisions are evaluated on the cost given the raw
demand, thus, the Jacobian of G is
gG = ∇GLu(x˜∗,d) = ∂Lu(x˜
∗,d)
∂x
∂x
∂d˜
∂d˜
∂G
. (9)
In the context of our storage control problem, the first term in
(9) is
∂Lu(x,d)
∂x
=

Qx+
 p−p
0
 , if Dx− d > 0
Qx otherwise
, (10)
where Q is given in the Appendix equation (21), I is the
identity matrix, and D =
[
I −I 0].
The second term, i.e. ∂x
∂d˜
, in (9) hinges on automatic
differentiation through a convex program [22], [23]. Because
an optimization problem can be viewed as a function mapping
the problem data to the primal and dual solutions, we can
convert problem (7) to a conic form and calculate the changes
of the optimal solution given the perturbations of the problem
data. It leverages the idea of finding a zero solution for the
residual map of a homogeneous self-dual embedding derived
from the KKT conditions of the convex program [23]–[25].
The third term in (9) is
dG :=
∂d˜
∂G
=
[
dd˜
ε1
. . . dd˜
εH
dd˜
p
dd˜
1−p
]
∈ RH×(H+2), (11)
since dd˜ = dG
[
ε
y
]
. Thus, all three terms in equation (9) can
be evaluated in the backward pass of the generator training and
we can update the filter weight G using stochastic gradient
decent [26]: Gk+1 := Gk−ηlgG where k is the iteration step
and ηl is the learning rate.
Remark: To summarize, Step 1 shown in equation (6) updates
the matrix G by minimizing the negative classification loss
(equivalent to maximizing the classification loss) of the ad-
versary, while maintaining the constraint determined in (5).
Step 2 calculates the optimal control of the storage using the
privatized demand. In Step 3, G is updated by evaluating the
gradient of the energy cost given the control based on the
privatized demand. The updates are expressed as
(update1)Ĝk+1 = Gk − η(k)l ∇GLa(fψ(d˜),y) (12a)
(update2)Gk+1 = Ĝk+1 − η(k)l ∇GLu(x˜∗,d) (12b)
(adversary update)ψk+1 = ψk − ηl∇ψLa(fψ(d˜),y), (12c)
which run until convergence. We set the learning rates in
each step to be equal for simplicity. The training procedure
is described in Algorithm 1.
D. Convergence of the filter
This subsection focuses on the stability and boundedness
of the iterates in our back-propagation that leverage stochas-
tic gradient methods (or some related variants of first-order
gradient methods). Using the subgradient property [27, Chap-
ter 9.1], g is a subgradient of f at x if
f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈g, y − x〉 ∀y, (13)
Algorithm 1: Minimax learning
Input: Demand data D, label data Y , learning rate ηl,
parameters {B,α, β1, β2, β3}, and hyper
parameters κ1, κ2
Initialize Gk, ψk at iteration k = 0 with batch size m;
while ψ or G has not converged do
1 draw batches of pair (d(i),y(i)) from demand and
label datasets (D,Y), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m;
2 Sample batch of Gaussian random vectors
ε(1),...,(m) ∼ N (0, I);
3 ψk+1 := ψk − ηlE[∇ψLa(fψ(d˜),y)];
4 Ĝk+1 := Gk − ηlE[∇GLa(fψ(d˜),y)];
5 Gk+1 := Ĝk+1 − ηlE[∇GLu(x˜∗,d)] where x˜∗ is
optimal solution of (7)
(The expected gradient value is approximated as the
sample mean of the batch.)
return G and ψ
and assuming G∗ is a local optimal point; when we apply the
step1 and step3 updates Gk+1 = Gk − η(k)l ∇L(k)a − η(k)l L(k)u
at the k-th iteration, we can obtain the following relationship
E[||Gk+1 −G∗||22] (14a)
=E[||Gk − η(k)l (∇L
(k)
a +∇L(k)u )−G∗||22] (14b)
=E[||Gk −G∗||22]− 2η(k)l E〈∇L
(k)
a +∇L(k)u ,Gk −G∗〉
+ (η
(k)
l )
2 ||∇L(k)a +∇L(k)u ||22︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ2
k
(14c)
(i)
= E[||Gk −G∗||22]− 2η(k)l E〈∇L
(k)
a ,Gk −G∗〉
− 2η(k)l E〈∇L
(k)
u ,Gk −G∗〉+ (η(k)l )2δ2k
(14d)
(ii)
≤ E[||Gk −G∗||22]− 2η(k)l
(La(Gk)− L∗a)
− 2η(k)l
(Lu(Gk)− L∗u)+ (η(k)l )2δ2k. (14e)
Equality (i) expands the inner product of the loss gradients and
iterates using δk for the norm of the sum of loss gradients. The
inequality (ii) uses the subgradient condition in equation (13),
L(Gk)−L(G∗) ≥ 〈∇L(k),Gk −G∗〉 (both for La and Lu).
Rearranging equation (14a) and equation (14e), we get
2η
(k)
l
(La(Gk)− L∗a)+ 2η(k)l (Lu(Gk)− L∗u)
≤ E[||Gk −G∗||22]− E[||Gk+1 −G∗||22] + (η(k)l )2δ2k.
(15)
By summing iterates up to step K, we get
2
( K∑
k=1
η
(k)
l
)
min
k∈[k]
[La(Gk)− L∗a] + min
k∈[k]
[Lu(Gk)− L∗u] (16a)
(iii)
≤ 2
K∑
k=1
η
(k)
l [La(Gk)− L∗a] + [Lu(Gk)− L∗u] (16b)
(iv)
≤ ||G1 −G∗||22 +
K∑
k=1
(η
(k)
l )
2δ2k (16c)
where (iii) is valid since we take the minimum over all itera-
tions and (iv) is derived from the summation of equation (15).
Then, arranging equation (16a) and equation (16c) gives
min
k∈[k]
[L1(Gk)− L∗1] + min
k∈[k]
[L2(Gk)− L∗2]
≤ ||G1 −G
∗||22 +
∑K
k=1(η
(k)
l )
2δ2k
2
∑K
k=1 η
(k)
l
(17a)
Thus, if the 2-norm of the vectorized version of G1 − G∗
is bounded by r, and with learning rate
∑
k η
(k)
l −→ ∞
but
∑
k(η
(k)
l )
2 < ∞, the right hand-side of equation (17a)
becomes r
2+
∑
k(η
(k)
l )
2δ2k
2
∑
k η
(k)
l
−→ 0. Therefore, using the gradient
updates in step1 and step3 minimizes the losses La,Lu and
converges to a local optimal point.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the capability of our linear
filter to (1) generate perturbed smart meter data that reduces
the prediction accuracy of sensitive attributes; (2) maintain
the minimum energy cost from an optimal control decision
using the perturbed data; (3) integrate into a contemporary
deep learning architecture with parallelism. The code for
our experiments is available at https://github.com/
markcx/DER_ControlPrivateTimeSeries.
A. Setup
We build up two neural networks to form the adversarial
classifier and generator. The adversarial classifier is composed
of two fully connected layers with ELU (Exponential Linear
Unit) activation to estimate the sensitive attribute from de-
mand. The first layer contains the same number of neurons
as the time steps of the meter data series used by the battery
optimal controller, and the second layer has half of the neuron
numbers of the first layer and outputs a two dimensional
vector representing the probability of the associated categories
of the label. The generator module is composed of a single
linear layer that takes a standard normal random vector and
the private labels as inputs, and outputs noise to be added
to the original demand. The parameters of the single linear
layer form matrix G. Additionally, we specify G to be block
diagonal to reduce the number of learning parameters, i.e.
G = [Γ,V ] where Γ is a diagonal matrix. Given the number
of columns in our weight matrix is cw (e.g. the cw for G is 26
for the solar dataset and 50 in our residential experiments), we
use uniform initialization [28] between (− 1cw , 1cw ) for both the
adversary and generator networks. We use 85% of the data for
training and the remaining 15% for testing the performance of
the filter. We set hyper-parameters β1 = β2 = β3 = 10−5, κ =
10−3 throughout the experiments. The learning rate for the
classifier is 10−3 and the learning rate for the generator starts
from 0.1 and decays 20% for every 100 steps. We present the
classification accuracy to indicate the correlation, as a lower
accuracy implies a lower value of mutual information [29],
thus, there is less correlation between the demand and sensitive
labels. We set the initial battery state of charge to 1% of its
maximum energy capacity, i.e. Binit = 0.01B. We use a time-
of-use price structure with two tiers: a high price of $0.463
per KWh from 4pm-9pm and $0.202 per KWh for the rest of
the day.
B. Examples
1) Integration of storage and solar generation: For our
first experiment, we aggregated 24-hour demand consumption
from thousands of homes into groups of 100-200 homes and
added solar generation. The aggregations represent the demand
seen at a secondary transformer from the perspective of a
utility company. The goal is to minimize the energy cost
by running the optimal charging and discharging controls for
battery storage given a prescribed price. Each demand comes
with a binary label indicating if the demand is from a high-
or low-income group. We wish to privatize the demand before
sending it to the storage operator to perform cost minimization,
so the operator cannot infer any sensitive information from
its customers. The left panel of Figure 1 shows the income
attribute can be easily inferred from the raw demand as the
height of the peaks are clearly distinguishable. The right panel
of Figure 1 shows that the privatized demands are perturbed
such that two labels overlap making it harder to tell which
demand has high or low income. However, there is a trade-off
Fig. 1. A batch of 24-hour demand with solar generation that is net negative
in certain hours allowing storage to minimize the cost through an optimal
charge and discharge sequence. The left panel shows the raw demand. The
right panel shows the privatized demand.
between privacy and utility when perturbing the data. We use
the hyper-parameter λa to balance the adversarial loss and the
utility loss i.e. smaller λa means less weight for privacy and
more for utility, as shown in Figure 2. When λa increases from
8 to 128, the classification accuracy of the income label drops
from 89.4% to 73% as we expected. The raw classification
accuracy with zero weight is 95.2%. The loss of performance
of the cost minimization by using privatized demand instead
of raw demand ranges from 5% at λa = 8 to almost 10% at
λa = 128 on average, which shows that high privacy comes
with a performance cost for this battery control problem.
2) Deployment of storage on residential users: The second
experiment considers residential customers adopting batteries
to minimize their energy cost without selling excess to the
grid. The control of the battery is performed by an outside
program, so the owner wishes to privatize their demand before
sending it to the controller. The dataset is from the Irish CER
Smart Metering Project [18], [30]. We select a year of meter
data for meters that contain a record indicating if they belong
to a large or small home and partition it into daily sequences
Fig. 2. The trade-off between privacy and utility controlled by parameter λa,
which places weight on the private attribute classification loss.
with 48 entries for each day. We end up with 54478 records
in total. Recall that our goal is to create altered demand that
won’t degrade the cost savings while removing the correlation
between the demand and the attribute indicating a small or
large home.
Figure 3 depicts the trade-off between utility degradation
and privacy gain for different weights on privacy loss. The
accuracy of classifying large or small homes based on the
raw demand is 77.5%. When we have low weight on the
privacy loss (e.g. λa = 0.5), the classification accuracy only
drops a little to 75%, with a greater sacrifice on cost saving
performance (e.g. increased to 8% more cost on average). In
the high privacy weight scenario, the classification accuracy
drops down to 50% as desired, while the utility performance
gap only increases up to 12%.
Fig. 3. The trade-off between the utility and privacy for the CER dataset [30].
The privacy label indicates a large or small home. λa weighs the privacy loss.
C. Parallelism
The experiments in this section are run on a six-core Intel
Core i7 CPU @2.2GHz. Current standard solvers like Gurobi
or Mosek without support of in-batch parallelism can be
computationally expensive for solving a quadratic problem.
Our filter makes use of automatic differentiation for a cone
program (DIFFCP) [23] and leverages multiprocessing to
speed up the forward and backward calculations.
Figure 4 displays the mean and standard deviation of
running each trial 8 times, showing that our batched module
outperforms Gurobi or Mosek, which are highly tuned com-
mercial solvers for reasonable batch sizes. For a minibatch
size of 128, we solve all problems in an average of 1.31
seconds, whereas Gurobi takes an average of 11.7 seconds.
This speed improvement for a single minibatch makes the
difference between a practical and an unusable solver in the
context of training a deep learning architecture.
Fig. 4. CPU run time of a batched optimization using Gurobi v8.1.0, Mosek
v8.1.0.60, and our parallel module.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a method for the privatization of personal
data that maintains its utility in the optimal control of energy
resources. Our method comprises a small linear filter that
adds random noise to the data conditional on the private
attributes we wish to protect. The linear filter is trained using
a minimax optimization procedure that balances the trade-off
between classifcation accuracy of the private attributes and
the performance of an optimal controller. Additionally, we
include a distortion penalty to preserve aspects of the data that
are not specified by the utility or privacy functions in order
to avoid adding arbitrary noise. We have demonstrated that
this method is capable of removing the correlation between
the released private data and the sensitive attributes while
maintaining limited loss of the utility of the data using two
datasets. Limitations of this method include the requirement
to solve an optimization in the training loop, which can be
computationally intensive for large problems; however, we
suspect only a few iterations of the optimization are needed to
achieve the desired gradients, which will dramatically reduce
the computation required.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Battery control details
We present a snapshot of the results for the storage control
based on the raw and private demand data. Figure 5 displays
the storage control for our experiment with aggregated homes
and solar generation. The upper-left and lower-left panel
show the 24-hour charging and discharging decisions with
each color representing one sample in a batch. The control
decisions made with raw versus privatized demand data are
closely aligned in general, but have different charging and
discharging amounts of power due to perturbation. However,
such an altered charging profile doesn’t increase the minimum
cost much as we can see from the upper-right and lower-
right panels of Figure 5. The electricity cost increases by a
maximum of $22 USD per day given that the highest daily
cost is around US $390 USD. (Each bin spans the range of
$2.5 USD for Figure 5.)
Fig. 5. Analysis of storage control for the aggregated homes experiment
with λa = 128. The upper- and lower-left panel show the charging and
discharging power in kilowatts (KW). Different colored curves represent
different samples in the batch. The upper-right panel shows the daily
electricity cost when operating the battery using raw or private demand (x-
axis is the sample number, y-axis is in dollars ($)). The lower-right panel
shows a histogram of the loss gap. (The x-axis is the increased cost in $; the
y-axis is the number of days that show similar cost increases in a batch. )
Fig. 6. Analysis of storage control for the CER data experiment with λa = 8.
Each panel has the same x- and y-axis as Figure 5
B. Quadratic problem
A canonical form of the quadratic constrained minimization
problem (QP) is expressed as follows:
min
x
1
2
xTQx+ qTx (18a)
s.t Ax = b (18b)
Gx ≤ h. (18c)
We first show that the basic battery storage problem can
be considered as a special case of QP. We start with the 24-
hour horizon storage problem in Problem1. We can express
the constraints from equation (1d) to equation (1f) as
I 0 0
−I 0 0
0 I 0
0 −I 0
0 0 I
0 0 −I
−I I 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
 xinxout
xs
 ≤

cin
0
cout
0
B
0
d

⇔ Gx ≤ h. (19)
We add a constraint that the net of the demand and storage is
greater than or equal to 0, so we can formulate the objective
as a QP. This constraint does not modify the original problem
as long as it is feasible because the optimal solution will
implicitly make the net of demand and storage greater than
or equal to 0. The constraints in equation (1b)-equation (1c)
are expressed as[
0 0 1, . . . 0
[ηinI, 0] [−1/ηoutI, 0] [I, 0]− [0, I]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
 xinxout
xs
 = [Binit
0
]
⇔ Ax = b,
(20)
with [I, 0] ∈ R23×24. The objective equation (1a) can be
converted to a standard QP by letting
Q =
β1I 0 00 β2I 0
0 0 β3I
 , q =
 p−p
−2β3αB1
 . (21)
Therefore, it is straightforward to discover that xTQx+ qTx
is the new form of the objective.
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